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Abstract
After the grounding of the Exxon Valdez, and its subsequent oil spill, all parties with
interests in Prince William Sound (PWS) were eager to prevent another major pollution
event. While they implemented several measures to reduce the risk of an oil spill, the
stakeholders disagreed about the effectiveness of these measures and the potential
effectiveness of further proposed measures. They formed a steering committee to
represent all the major stakeholders in the oil industry, in the government, in local
industry and among the local citizens. The steering committee hired a consultant team,
who created a detailed model of the PWS system, integrating system simulation, data
analysis, and expert judgment. The model was capable of assessing the current risk of
accidents involving oil tankers operating in the Prince William Sound and of evaluating
measures aimed at reducing this risk. The risk model showed that actions taken prior to
the study had reduced the risk of oil spill by 75 percent and identified measures estimated
to reduce the accident frequency by an additional 68 percent, including improving the
safety management systems of the oil companies and stationing an enhanced capability
tug, called the Gulf Service, at Hinchinbrook Entrance. In all, various stakeholders made
multi-million dollar investments to reduce the risk of further oil spills based on the results
of the risk assessment.

(Decision analysis: risk. Industries: petroleum, transportation. Reliability: system safety)
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On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef, spilling an estimated
11 million gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound, Alaska. The oil spill (Figure 1)
spread rapidly, affecting more than 1,500 miles of shoreline. The spill had both
immediate and lingering effects on fish and wildlife resources and on the lives of people
in coastal communities. The cost to Exxon Corporation for clean up operations was
estimated to be $2.2 billion (Harrald et al. 1990).
After the accident, all parties with interests in Prince William Sound (PWS)
agreed to work to prevent such an event from happening again. They implemented
several ideas for reducing the risk of an oil spill. They introduced weather-based closure
restrictions that stopped all transits through Valdez Narrows and Hinchinbrook Entrance
(Figure 2) during periods of high winds. The US Coast Guard designated Valdez Narrows
a special navigation zone by restricting passage through the Narrows to one-way for
deep-draft traffic, including oil tankers. The oil companies introduced escort tugs to
accompany oil-laden tankers in their transit out of Prince William Sound. These tugs
were to assist a tanker if they had propulsion or steering failures, attaching lines to the
disabled tanker and holding it fast, thus preventing grounding accidents. The Oil
Pollution Act (1990) stated that two escort tugs should accompany each oil-laden tanker;
depending on the wind conditions and the size of the tanker, three tugs were sometimes
used.
In early 1995, questions arose concerning the effectiveness and benefits of
existing and proposed risk intervention measures. The PWS shipping companies (ARCO
Marine Inc., BP Oil Shipping Company, USA, Chevron Shipping Company, SeaRiver
Maritime Inc., and Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Company) concluded that they needed a
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comprehensive risk assessment to evaluate all proposals. They formed a steering
committee along with the PWS Regional Citizens Advisory Committee (RCAC)
[http://www.pwsrcac.org], the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
(ADEC) [http://www.state.ak.us/dec/], and the US Coast Guard (USCG). The members
consisted of presidents of oil shipping companies, local fisherman and environmentalists
representing the RCAC, senior representatives of ADEC, and the USCG Captain of the
Port for Valdez. Although the members of the group had different perspectives on the
operation of the oil-transportation system, the committee captured the substantive
expertise of the PWS oil transportation and eco system.
By forming the steering committee, the PWS community formalized its
preference for a collaborative analysis approach rather than an adversarial one (Charnley
2000). Up to this point, the adversarial approach had prevailed in PWS risk and safety
studies, pitting expert against expert. The adversarial approach often leads to a lack of
trust in the decision-making process and subsequently may hamper the implementation of
regulations and procedures aimed at reducing risk. Many see lack of trust as the major
reason for the failure of sophisticated technological risk assessments to influence public
policy in the nuclear power arena (Slovic 1993).
The steering committee decided to fund a risk assessment effort for the PWS oil
transportation system and engaged a consultant team from George Washington
University (GWU), Rennslaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI), and Det Norske Veritas
(DNV). The committee stipulated the objectives of the risk assessment effort:
•

to identify and evaluate the risks of oil transportation in PWS,

•

to identify, evaluate, and rank proposed risk reduction measures, and
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•

to develop a risk management plan and risk management tools that can be used to
support a risk management program.

This paper presents an overview of the modeling and analysis used in addressing the first
two objectives, as well as a discussion of the effect of the analysis on the third objective
and the implementation of the recommendations.

Risk Assessment and Management in Maritime Transportation
The National Research Council identified the assessment and management of risk in
maritime transportation as an important problem domain (NRC 1986 1991 1994 2000). In
earlier work, researchers concentrated on assessing the safety of individual vessels or
marine structures, such as nuclear powered vessels (Pravda & Lightner 1966), vessels
transporting liquefied natural gas (Stiehl 1977) and offshore oil and gas platforms (PatéCornell 1990). The USCG tried to prioritize federal spending to improve port
infrastructures using a classical statistical analysis of nationwide accident data (USCG
1973; Maio et al. 1991). More recently, researchers have used probabilistic risk
assessment (PRA) (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1975) in the maritime domain
(Hara and Nakamura 1995; Roeleven et al. 1995; Kite-Powell 1996; Slob 1998; Fowler
and Sorgard 2000; Trbojevic and Carr 2000; Wang 2000; Guedes Soares and Teixeira
2001) by examining risk in the context of maritime transportation systems (NRC 1999).
In a maritime transportation system (MTS), traffic patterns change over time in a
complex manner. Researchers have used system simulation as a modeling tool to assess
MTS service levels (Andrews et al. 1996), to perform logistical analysis (Golkar et al.
1998) and to facilitate the design of ports (Ryan 1998). The dynamic nature of traffic
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patterns and other situational variables, such as wind, visibility, and ice conditions, mean
that risk levels change over time. The PWS risk assessment differs from previous
maritime risk assessments in capturing the dynamic nature of risk by integrating system
simulation (Banks et al. 2000) with available techniques in the field of probabilistic risk
assessment (Bedford and Cooke 2001) and expert judgment elicitation (Cooke, 1991).
The following sections discuss the definition of risk used in the PWS risk assessment, the
system risk simulation model, the codification of expert judgment, the results of the risk
assessment, the validity of the results, actions taken following the PWS risk assessment
and finally the benefits of the risk assessment process followed.

Defining Risk
Lowrance (1976) defines risk as a measure of the probability and severity of the
consequences of undesirable events. In the PWS risk assessment, we define the
undesirable events to be accidents involving oil tankers, specifically the following:
•

Collisions: An underway tanker colliding with or striking another underway
vessel as a result of human error or mechanical failure and lack of vigilance
(inter-vessel collision) or striking a floating object, for example ice.

•

Drift Groundings: A drifting tanker out of control because of a propulsion or
steering failure making contact with the shore or bottom.

•

Powered Groundings: An underway tanker under power making contact with
the shore or bottom because of navigational error or steering failure and lack
of vigilance.

•

Foundering: A tanker sinking because of water ingress or loss of stability.
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•

Fire/Explosion: A fire occurring in the machinery, hotel, navigational, or
cargo space of a tanker or an explosion occurring in the machinery or cargo
spaces.

•

Structural Failure: The hull or frame cracking or eroding seriously enough to
affect the structural integrity of the tanker.

The consequence of interest was oil outflow into Prince William Sound. The initial
measure the Steering Committee wanted was the expected volume of oil outflow per year
for each accident type and specified locations. However, after further discussion, it
decided that any accident involving an oil tanker was an undesirable event, and thus the
focus shifted to the expected number of accidents per year again broken down by
accident type and location. We defined boundaries for seven locations to use in the study
(Figure 2).
The basic technique used in the PWS risk assessment is PRA (Bedford and Cooke
2001). In performing a PRA, one identifies the series of events leading to an accident,
estimates the probabilities of these events, and evaluates the consequences of the
accident. Garrick (1984) notes that an accident is not a single event but the culmination of
a series of events. A triggering incident is defined to be the immediate precursor of an
accident. In the PWS risk assessment, we separated triggering incidents into mechanical
failures and human errors. The mechanical failures considered to be triggering incidents
were propulsion failures, steering failures, electrical power failures, and hull failures. The
classifications of human errors used were diminished ability, hazardous shipboard
environment, lack of knowledge, skills or experience, poor management practices and
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faulty perceptions or understanding. We based these on current US Coast Guard
classifications.
We constructed an accident probability model using the relationships between the
vessel’s operating environment, triggering incidents and accidents (Roeleven et al.,
1995). The combination of organizational and situational factors that describes the state
of the system in which an accident may occur is termed an opportunity for incident (OFI).
We based our accident model on the following conditional probabilities:
•

P(OFI): the probability that a particular system state occurs,

•

P(Incident| OFI): the probability that a triggering incident occurs in this system
state,

•

P(Accident| Incident, OFI): the probability that an accident occurs given that a
triggering incident has occurred in this system state.

Once one has specified these probabilities, one can find the probability of an accident
occurring in the system by summing the product of the conditional probabilities over all
types of accidents and triggering incidents and all combinations of organizational and
situational factors according to the law of total probability. Thus to perform an
assessment of the risk of an accident using this model, one must determine an operational
definition of an OFI and then estimate each of the terms in the probability model. Harrald
et al. (1998) discuss the operational definition of an OFI in the PWS risk assessment.

The System Risk Simulation Model
The first term to estimate is the frequency of occurrence of each combination of
organizational or situational factors, that is, each OFI. Although data is collected on

7

vessel arrivals and environmental conditions, the combinations of these events are not.
Traffic rules, such as a one-way zone, mean that the movements of vessels are dependent,
while weather-based closure restrictions cause dependence between vessel movements
and environmental conditions. A discrete-event simulation of the system captures the
complex dynamic nature of the system and accurately models the interactions between
the vessels and their environment.
We created the simulation model using operational data, such as vessel type and
vessel movement data from the USCG vessel traffic service, tanker arrival and departure
information from the ship escort/response vessel system (SERVS), and publicly available
data, such as meteorological data from the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration weather buoys. More difficult to obtain were data on open fishing times,
locations, and durations, requiring local community surveys. Based on the data, we
developed traffic arrival models and weather models. In addition, because all deep-draft
vessels transiting PWS must participate in the USCG vessel traffic service and follow a
defined set of traffic rules, such as weather-based closure restrictions, one-way zones, the
tug escort scheme, and docking procedures, we programmed these rules into the
simulation.
We used the simulation as an event counter, that is we used it to count the number
of occurrences of individual OFIs throughout the PWS for a given time period. The
simulation calculated the state of the system once every five minutes based upon the
traffic arrivals, the weather, and the previous state of the system. We ran the simulation
for 25-years of simulation time and, for each five-minute period, tabulated the OFIs that
occurred and thus determined OFI frequencies (Merrick et al. 2000).
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We estimated the two levels of conditional probability of triggering incidents and
accidents. The preferred method for estimating these probabilities is through data. The
steering committee required that we use only PWS specific data in the risk assessment,
rather than worldwide accident data that might not be representative. Each of the PWS
shipping companies supplied proprietary mechanical failure data. However, at the time
we could obtain no reliable PWS human error data in the maritime domain and we could
obtain very little from near miss reports (Harrald et al. 1998). Large databases of local
accident data were not available for standard statistical analysis of the organizational and
situational factors that could affect risk. Cooke (1991) cites the use of expert judgment in
areas as diverse as aerospace programs, military intelligence, nuclear engineering and
weather forecasting. We used expert judgment to assess relative conditional probabilities,
and data to calibrate these relative probabilities.
Using the log-linear accident probability model (Roeleven 1995), we obtained
relative conditional probabilities through a regression analysis of pairwise comparison
surveys (Bradley and Terry 1952) constructed for the pilots, captains, and chief engineers
with operational experience in the PWS. PWS oil shipping companies, SERVS and
regional representatives on the PWS steering committee made these substantive experts
available for elicitation sessions. An example of the type of questions posed is the
following taken from the expert judgment questionnaire for collisions given that a
propulsion failure has occurred (Table 1). In each situation there is an inbound tanker,
greater than 150,000 DWT in size, which has just experienced a propulsion failure. It is
within 2 to 10 miles of a tug with tow in winds over 45 MPH blowing on shore to the
closest shore point with visibility greater than half a mile in the Central Prince William

9

Sound. The only difference between the two situations is that the first situation includes
an ice flow in the traffic lane, while the second does not. We ask the expert to picture the
two situations, to determine which situation is more likely to result in a collision and to
indicate their sense of magnitude in the choice through a nine point scale, with one
indicating equally likely (Saaty 1977).
For each question, we changed only one attribute so that the experts could
estimate the difference in risk between the two situations. The experts could answer a
book of 120 questions in one to one and a half hours. We put the questions in the books
in random order and statistically tested the results to ensure nonrandom responses and to
minimize response bias. All participants had very extensive knowledge, with at least 20
years of experience at sea. We treated the expert responses as ratios of the probabilities of
an accident in each scenario. We estimated the parameters of the accident probability
model using statistical regression and calibrated the model to available data. The Prince
William Sound Risk Assessment Final Report contains specific details of the development
of the simulation model, the design and analysis of the expert judgment questionnaires,
and the integration of the simulation model and the accident probability model (PWS
Steering Committee 1996).
The integrated system risk simulation model was capable of assessing the current
risk of accidents involving oil tankers operating in PWS and of evaluating riskintervention measures. We also implemented an oil outflow model, created by DNV, in
the system risk simulation program. The program displayed risk in PWS dynamically
(Figure 3) and we could interrogate it to determine the expected frequencies of accidents
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or the expected oil outflow per year broken down by accident type, location, and any of
the organizational or situational factors.

Results of the Risk Assessment
The steering committee’s first objective was to identify and evaluate the risks of oil
transportation in PWS. We chose accident scenarios as the method of reporting, defining
an accident scenario to be an accident type in a given location. We programmed the
simulation to represent the shipping fleet, traffic rules and operating procedures in place
in 1996, the year we performed the study. We ran the simulation program for 25 years
(simulation time) and estimated the expected frequency of accidents. We broke the
frequencies down by location and accident type to obtain the accident scenario results. As
the primary interest was accident scenarios with the highest expected frequencies, we
reported the results by sorting the accident scenarios from highest to lowest (Figure 4).
Before the risk assessment, people in PWS commonly believed that the most
likely accident scenario was a drift or powered grounding in the Valdez Narrows or
Hinchinbrook Entrance. However, we showed that the first seven accident scenarios
accounted for 80 percent of the total expected frequency of accidents, with 60 percent
coming from collisions in the port, in the Valdez Narrows and in the Valdez Arm. We
performed a further analysis to find the primary cause of these accidents. We found that
the primary risk was collisions with fishing vessels that operate in large numbers in these
locations during fishing openers. Although they introduce a relatively high risk of
collision, few fishing vessels are large enough to penetrate the hull of a tanker. Thus the
expected oil outflow from these events was low. The perceived high-risk scenarios of
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drift or powered groundings contributed approximately 15 percent of the expected
frequency of accidents.
Integrating the oil outflow model with the estimated frequencies of accident
scenarios allowed us to estimate the expected volume of oil outflow as a measure of risk,
again reported from highest to lowest (Figure 5). We discovered a surprising result using
this metric. Potential collisions of outbound tankers with inbound SERVs’ tugs (returning
from escort duty) are a large contributor to the total expected oil outflow. Escort tugs
leaving port with a tanker are intended to save the tanker in case of a propulsion or
steering failure, but on their return from escort they introduce a risk of collision and can
cause enough damage to tankers to spill oil. Less suprising, however, was the
confirmation of the risk of drift or powered groundings in the Valdez Narrows or
Hinchinbrook Entrance.
The steering committee’s second objective was to identify, evaluate, and rank
proposed risk intervention measures. We developed a set of risk-intervention measures
for evaluation in consultation with the PWS steering committee. We classified riskinterventions in terms of their effect on modeling parameters and analyzed them
accordingly. The modeling required was extensive, but because of the level of granularity
incorporated in the system risk simulation model, we could change parameters of the
accident probability model or simulation code to reflect the effects of risk-intervention
measures. By stripping away previously implemented risk-intervention measures, we
estimated the risk prior to the Exxon Valdez accident. Comparing this risk to the baseline
case, representing the PWS system during the study period, we estimated that the
accident frequency had been reduced 75 percent since the Exxon Valdez accident.
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We identified further effective risk-intervention measures (Figure 6). Under the
current system, interactions with fishing vessels and escort tugs were significant
contributors to the overall risk. We developed rules to reduce the number of these
interactions in cooperation with the Steering Committee and programmed them into the
simulation. We demonstrated that modifying the escort scheme to reduce interactions
with tankers and managing the interactions of fishing vessels and tankers lead to a major
reduction in risk. The model also indicated that improving human and organizational
performance through the International Safety Management (ISM) program would further
reduce risk. We estimated the reduction in risk obtained by reducing the frequency of
human errors in the accident probability model, with the reduction being estimated by
personnel from DNV with experience in implementing the ISM program. We showed
that some proposed risk-intervention measure increase risk, for example we showed that
additional weather-based closure restrictions would increase traffic congestion.
Estimates of expected accident frequency and expected oil outflow by accident
scenario are point estimates of risk. The preferred method for reporting accident risk
would be a distribution that also represents the degree of uncertainty in the results (PatéCornell 1996). Although we proposed an uncertainty analysis to the steering committee,
time and budgetary constraints did not allow it. This was a drawback in the study and
additional research is needed to develop a technique to assess uncertainties in the system
risk simulation model. The value of an analysis, however, is not only in the precision of
the results, but in understanding system risk. Unlike risk assessments in more traditional
areas, for example nuclear power, our focus was the dynamic risk behavior of the system.
For risk management purposes it is valuable to identify the peaks, patterns, unusual
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circumstances, and trends in system risk and in changes in system risk made by
implementation of risk-intervention measures.

Validity of the Results
In any study, it is important to validate the results. To assess the validity of our results,
we need to validate both the simulation of the PWS system and the expert judgment
based estimates of accident and incident probabilities. We used graphical comparison to
the actual system and numerical comparison using summary statistics to validate the
simulation part of the model. Specifically, USCG personnel from the Vessel Traffic
Service (VTS) in PWS, who monitor traffic using screens resembling the graphical
simulation output, verified the general behavior of traffic in the simulation regarding
adherence to traffic rules, and patterns of vessel arrivals and departures. In addition, we
compared summary statistics from the simulation, such as the average number of trips to
the anchorage area as a result of weather-based closure conditions, the average number of
tanker diversions due to ice in tanker lanes and the average number of closed waterways
at separate locations due to weather restrictions, to those observed in the VTS system.
However, estimates of accident and incident probabilities based on expert
judgments are more difficult to validate. While the use of proper procedures, such as
structured and proven elicitation methods, can reduce uncertainty and bias in an analysis,
they can never be eliminated. As one referee noted, our use of mariners with experience
in PWS could introduce a group bias. For example, had the Exxon Valdez not run
aground, the opinions of the experts might have been quite different. The bias the referee
refers to is availability bias (Cooke 1991), that is, people make assessments in accordance
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with the ease with which they can retrieve similar events. In the case of the Exxon Valdez
accident, the effect of the availability bias would be to increase perceived levels of
accident risk. However, each question in the PWS questionnaires required the
comparison of two carefully defined scenarios. One could argue that both scenarios
would be affected by the availability bias in a similar manner. As a result, the effect of
the availability bias would be reduced. The Exxon Valdez accident scenario (a powered
grounding of a tanker in the Valdez Arm) received only a modest ranking of 10 out of 17
accident scenario’s that contribute to approximately 95 percent of total accident risk
(Figure 4).
Risk assessments typically deal with low probability, high consequence events,
and thus statistical validation of their results is difficult even when using nationwide or
global accident databases. Using nationwide or global accident data in localized risk
assessments is also questionable in terms of validity, prompting the PWS steering
committee to require our use of only PWS specific data. This requirement meant we
could not validate our risk assessment in the traditional sense. In the case of the
probability of triggering incidents, such as mechanical failures, where available data and
expert judgments overlapped, we observed good correspondence. Such correspondence
could add to the validity of the other expert based estimates, where such comparisons
could not be made.
In the PWS risk assessment we followed a collaborative analysis approach
(Charnley 2000). This included educating the steering committee in the language and
modeling of risk. As we developed a common framework for analyzing risk, we
discussed proposed risk-intervention measures at the level of their detailed effect on the
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whole system, rather than their gross effects on one part. We discussed the assumptions
behind the model with the steering committee. The members of the steering committee
were able to challenge the assumptions upon which they based their own opinions
concerning the operation of the oil transportation system in PWS.
We presented all our results to the steering committee in monthly meetings. The
members questioned various results and often required more detailed analysis to reach a
deeper understanding. The simulation model allowed us to demonstrate many results
graphically, giving the steering committee a better intuition and trust in their validity.
Members challenged certain results and often identified problems with the analysis, such
as incorrect implementation of vessel traffic rules in the simulation, which we corrected.
The committee put no pressure on us to change results merely because members
disagreed. In the end, the steering committee unanimously accepted the results we
obtained with the system risk simulation model despite members’ diverse perspectives at
the onset of the study. Using the collaborative analysis approach, we built on the
substantive knowledge represented in the steering committee and instilled trust in our
results and recommendations, normally acquired through the use of classical statistical
validation procedures.

Actions Taken
At the conclusion of the study, our contract team delivered a final report to the steering
committee (Prince William Sound Steering Committee 1996). This report included
technical documentation of the methodology used in the study, the results of the
modeling and recommendations based on these results. Following the risk assessment
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project, the steering committee split up into risk management teams charged with
implementing the recommendations in specific areas.
One of the key questions the steering committee asked at the start of the study was
whether the current escort system was capable of stopping drift groundings in the Valdez
Narrows. The study showed that the current escort tugs were capable of saving a disabled
tanker in the environmental conditions experienced in the Valdez Narrows. However,
because of other considerations the PWS shipping companies decided to accept proposals
for two tractor-tugs. The designers used our result extensively in the design process.
Crowley Maritime Services have invested $30 million to build the tugs Nanuq (Figure 7)
and Tan’erliq to fulfill the requirements developed.
To date the various organizations comprising the risk management teams have taken
the following actions based on our results:
•

The oil companies have introduced an enhanced capability tug called the Gulf
Service (Figure 8) to escort oil laden tankers through Hinchinbrook Entrance,
which is being replaced by new azimuthing stern-drive escort vessels designed for
higher transit speed/open water assist scenarios that include the Hinchinbrook
Entrance transit.

•

We have completed a further project to find an improved escort scheme, which
SERVS have adopted, minimizing interactions between oil tankers and escort
tugs, while maintaining the ability to save disabled tankers.

•

The Coast Guard VTS manage interactions between fishing vessels and tankers.

•

SERVS has increased the minimum required bridge crew on board escort tugs
from one to two to add additional error capture capability.
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•

The International Maritime Organization has approved a change to the tanker
route through central PWS reducing the number of course changes required.

•

The shipping companies have made long term plans for quality assurance and
safety management programs.

The Benefits of the Risk Assessment Process
It is difficult to compare this project with other more traditional projects in operations
research and management science, whose benefits are typically measured in terms of
reduced operating costs or increased profits. The benefits of risk assessments are less
tangible as the objective is to reduce the occurrence of future accidents. However,
because clean-up operations for the Exxon Valdez accident cost over $2 billion, the
benefits of preventing a single such accident would be of similar magnitude. We can only
estimate the reduction in the frequency of accidents using our models and can only
estimate the benefits of the study in terms of clean-up cost. Using our risk models, we
estimated that accident frequency had been reduced by 75 percent since the Exxon
Valdez accident. According to our risk models, the further reduction in accident
frequency from all measures taken as a result of the Prince William Sound Risk
assessment is 68 percent, with a 51 percent reduction in the expected oil outflow. This
means that, since the Exxon Valdez accident, the accident frequency has been reduced by
an estimated total of 92 percent. The costs of the risk assessment, roughly $2 million over
a two-year period, pale in comparison to the potential clean-up costs for a single major oil
spill resulting from a tanker accident. However, the benefits go beyond clean-up costs
and include the protection of pristine environments, and the prevention of loss of life and
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injury to vessel crews. In addition, the shipping companies have used the results of the
PWS model in making decisions to invest in multi-million dollar equipment.
While the stakeholders in PWS all recognized the need for a rational method to
evaluate the merits of risk intervention measures, to improve the allocation of resources
and to avoid implementing measures that would adversely affect system risk, they did not
trust ach other at the beginning of the project. The steering committee wanted to use the
project as a forum to build trust amongst stakeholders, to educate of all interested parties,
and to provide a common understanding of oil transportation risk. The PWS risk
assessment fostered a cooperative risk-management atmosphere involving all
stakeholders.
At the end of the project, the stakeholders published the final report as their
document, not just as a report from the consultant team. Members of the steering
committee from environmental groups, the fishing industry and the oil companies wrote
joint press briefings and formed risk-management teams to manage implementation of
the model results. The unified acceptance and presentation of the results of the study by
all stakeholders and the level of implementation of the results can be primarily
considered a benefit of the collaborative analysis process. All stakeholders finished the
project convinced that they had reduced risk of further multi-billion dollar accidents and,
with the cooperation fostered by the collaborative analysis process, the stage has been set
for further improvements in managing risk.
The success of the Prince William Sound risk assessment has not gone unnoticed
and National Science Foundation has awarded other researchers funding (e.g. NSF SBR9520194, NSF SBR-9710522) to study the risk-assessment process we followed. Our
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study is described as an example collaborative analysis by Busenberg (2000) and
Charnley (2000). Busenberg (1999) commented as follows:

“All ten of the participants who were interviewed agreed that this process allowed the
steering committee to gain a better understanding of the technical dimensions of
maritime risk assessment … The results of the risk assessment were released in late 1996,
and were unanimously accepted as valid by the RCAC, oil industry, and government
agencies involved in this issue. The participating groups agreed that the study showed the
need for an ocean rescue tug vessel in the Sound. In 1997, the oil industry responded by
deploying a vessel of this class in the Sound.”
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Table 1. We elicited expert judgments from the substantive experts using pairwise
comparison questionnaires in which we defined a given scenario and varied only one
attribute, in this example changing whether there is ice in the traffic lanes.

Figure 1. The stricken Exxon Valdez spilled oil in to Prince William Sound, Alaska
affecting over 1,500 miles of shoreline.

Figure 2. We divided Prince William Sound into seven locations for reporting risk.

Figure 3. We created the system risk simulation program to perform the analysis
and demonstrate the results to the steering committee. On the left is a display of the
dynamic behavior of the Prince William Sound marine transportation system
including traffic patterns and environmental conditions, such as wind speed and
direction. On the right, the analysis shown is broken into seven locations (Figure 2),
with estimates of the probability of an opportunity for an incident, the probability
of an accident given such an opportunity and finally the dynamic variation in the
expected frequency of accidents for the whole region.

Figure 4. We sorted the combinations of accident types and locations by their
expected frequency (dark bars). The cumulative percentage of the total expected
frequency up to each such combination (white bars) is indicated by the total height
of each bar. For example, we found that the first seven accident scenarios account
for 80 percent of the total expected frequency of accidents.
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Figure 5. We sorted the combinations of accident types and locations by their
expected oil outflow (dark bars). The cumulative percentage of the total expected oil
outflow up to each such combination (white bars) is indicated by the total height of
each bar. For example, we found that the first seven accident scenarios account for
55 percent of the total expected oil outflow.

Figure 6. We tested proposed risk interventions in the system risk simulation and
ranked them by percentage reduction from the study year in the expected frequency
of accidents (black bars) and expected oil outflow (white bars) per year.

Figure 7. The 153-foot, 10,000 horsepower, state-of-the-art tractor-tug Nanuq has
been put in service to escort tankers through Valdez Narrows.

Figure 8. The enhanced capability tug Gulf Service has been stationed at
Hinchinbrook Entrance to save disabled tankers even in extreme environmental
conditions.
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Location
Central Sound
Traffic Proximity
Vessels 2 to 10 Miles
Traffic Type
Tug with Tow
Tanker Size & Direction Inbound More Than 150DWT
Escort Vessels
Two or more
Wind Speed
More Than 45
Wind Direction
Perpendicular/On Shore
Visibility
Greater Than 1/2 Mile
Ice Conditions
Bergy Bits Within a Mile

LIKELIHOOD OF COLLISION
98765432123456789

No Bergy Bits in a Mile
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Location
Traffic Proximity
Traffic Type
Tanker Size & Direction
Escort Vessels
Wind Speed
Wind Direction
Visibility
Ice Conditions
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1. Port
2. Valdez
Narrows

5. Valdez
Arm

3. Central
PWS

6. Anchorage

7. Hinchinbrook
Entrance
4. Gulf of
Alaska
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